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ABSTRACT
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN GOODS AND PARKING FEES IN SHOPPING
MALLS
ZELİHA BEGÜM TUNÇ
ECONOMICS M.A. THESIS, JULY 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Eren İnci
Keywords: horizontal product differentiation, monopoly pricing, parking fee, price
discrimination, shopping mall
This thesis analyzes the pricing strategy of a monopolist shopping mall when it can
price discriminate. The mall determines the prices of the goods and parking fees
and it can identify different market segments. Customers can visit the mall only
by car and they may leave the mall without any purchases. We find that when
customers are differentiated with respect to their attitudes towards risk, the mall
provides free parking for the most risk-averse customer and not necessarily for the
other customers. In all other cases, the mall always provides free parking for all and
charges customers more as their likeliness of buying the good decrease.
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ÖZET
ALIŞVERİŞ MERKEZLERİNDE ÜRÜN VE PARK ÜCRETLERİNDE FİYAT
FARKLILAŞTIRMASI
ZELİHA BEGÜM TUNÇ
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Eren İnci
Anahtar Kelimeler: yatay ürün farklılaştırması, tekel fiyatlandırması, park yeri
ücreti, fiyat farklılaştırması, alışveriş merkezi
Bu tez, tekel bir alışveriş merkezinin fiyat farklılaştırabildiğinde oluşturduğu
fiyatlandırma stratejisini incelemektedir. Alışveriş merkezi, ürünlerin ve park
yerinin ücretlerini belirlemektedir ve farklı pazar segmentlerini tanımlayabilmek-
tedir. Tüketiciler, alışveriş merkezine yalnızca arabayla gidebilmektedirler ve ürünü
satın almayabilirler. Tüketiciler risk davranışlarına göre ayrıldığında, dengede
alışveriş merkezi park yerini riskten en çok kaçınan tüketiciye ücretsiz olarak sağla-
maktadır; ancak diğer tüketicileri ücretlendirebilir. Diğer tüm durumlarda, dengede
alışveriş merkezi park yerini herkese ücretsiz olarak sunmaktadır ve tüketicilerin bir
ürünü satın alma olasılığı azaldıkça, alışveriş merkezi o ürünün fiyatını arttırmak-
tadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an extension of the base model constructed by Hasker and Inci (2014)
and studies the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolist shopping mall under price
discrimination and horizontal product differentiation. The mall provides a parking
lot to the visitors and decides on the prices of the goods and parking fees. Customers
can buy at most one type of good in one visit and they can visit the mall only by
car. There are different types of customers and the mall can identify the types of
customers to some degree. We examine the equilibrium prices and fees under each
class of differentiation. The main contribution of this thesis is that unless customers
are differentiated with respect to their degree of risk-aversion, there is always a
negative relationship between the price of the good and the probability of buying
the good. That is, as customers become more likely to buy the good, they pay less
for the good. Furthermore, parking is free for all and the cost of the parking is
embedded in the prices of the goods.
The economics of parking studies parking markets from an economic perspective.
Parking is one of the most crucial aspects of urban life since it is one of the most
used intermediate goods which generates a vast amount of land use. Shopping
malls provide a parking lot for its visitors and these parking lots comprise a high
percentage of parking space. To my knowledge, Hasker and Inci (2014) are the first
to construct the shopping mall parking problem. They show that suburban malls
provide free parking in equilibrium and embed the cost of parking in the price of
the good. They demonstrate that it is the social optimum in a second-best sense.
They construct a model in which a risk-neutral monopolist mall sells one good and
customers are strictly risk-averse and they can reach the mall only by car. Customers
decide on buying the good only after visiting the mall and there is a probability that
they may leave the mall without any purchase. Hence, the mall has an incentive to
insure risk-averse customers to some degree by providing free parking. The authors
find that the results are robust to the extension of the base model. In particular,
the results still hold if the mall decides on the parking lot size, provides vouchers, or
prices in a competitive manner. On the other hand, they find that it is optimal for
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the mall to set a positive parking fee when there are individuals with the intention
of using the parking lot but not visiting the mall.
This thesis extends the base model of Hasker and Inci (2014) by allowing the mall to
identify different market segments, and hence implement price discrimination and
product differentiation. In this setting, since the mall has the ability to separate
the markets, and hence the parking lots, the following question arises: How does
the mall set the prices of different products and parking fees to different types of
customers? It turns out that a crucial instrument in answering this question is the
probability of finding (or buying) the good, which is introduced by Hasker and Inci
(2014). Moreover, Hasker and Inci (2014) find that their results are independent of
the degree of risk aversion. We find that when the mall can identify different market
segments, these results do not necessarily hold under certain conditions.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature.
Chapter 3 presents Hasker and Inci (2014) model and solves the constrained op-
timization problem. Chapter 4 sets up the model for two types of customers and
derives the equilibrium under price discrimination. Chapter 5 analyzes the model
for two types of goods and derives the equilibrium under horizontal product differ-
entiation. Chapter 6 extends the model of Chapter 4 for more than two types of
customers. Chapter 7 extends the model of Chapter 5 for more than two types of
goods. Chapter 8 concludes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Parking literature mostly focuses on the pricing of parking when there is search
externality or congestion externality. There are also studies on minimum and max-
imum parking requirements, road pricing, and shopping mall parking.
There is a significant amount of work on cruising for parking. Shoup (2006) points
out that cruising causes traffic congestion, fuel waste, and pollution. He examines
how drivers make the decision between cruising for free curb parking and paying
for off-street parking. He finds that cheap curb parking, cheap fuel, and expensive
off-street parking are among the factors that make drivers more likely to cruise. He
also shows that a positive fee for curb parking can sufficiently decrease cruising.
Arnott and Inci (2006) analyze cruising for parking by constructing a downtown
parking model of traffic congestion and saturated on-street parking. They examine
the equilibrium outcomes when cruising for parking leads to traffic congestion. They
find that the on-street parking fee must be set high until the drivers do not cruise and
parking is saturated. They show that this result is robust. Moreover, they find that
when the parking fee is fixed, setting the number of on-street parking spaces high
until the drivers do not cruise and parking is saturated is the second-best optimal.
Research on spatial competition has been extensive. Arnott and Rowse (1999)
present a stochastic model of parking congestion in which congestion is caused by
drivers because they disregard their impact on the mean density of vacant parking
spaces. They analyze stochastic stationary-state equilibria and find that there may
exist multiple equilibria. However, when they examine the social optimum, they
find that the optimal parking fee is equal to the congestion externality.
Anderson and de Palma (2004) develop a model of parking congestion in which
parking is unassigned and drivers need to search for an on-street parking spot. They
indicate that when parking is unpriced, parking spaces that are near to the central
business district (CBD) are overused while the distant parking lots are underused.
They find that in equilibrium, the prices must be set by taking congestion externality
into account and the parking lots near to the CBD must be charged higher. They
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also point out that drivers do not take into consideration that they increase the
search cost of other drivers while searching for a parking spot near to the CBD. The
authors also show how to decentralize the optimum.
Anderson and de Palma (2007) provide an extension of the model of Anderson and
de Palma (2004) by endogenizing the land use. They find that socially optimum is
reached under a monopolistically competitive market, which supports the results of
Anderson and de Palma (2004).
Inci and Lindsey (2015) construct a spatial parking model. In their model, there are
long-term and short-term parkers and drivers can park either in garages or on the
curbside. Curbside parking is scarce and subject to traffic congestion, hence there
is a search cost for drivers. Garages compete with each other and with the public
curbside parking lot. Since parkers differ in their duration of parking, the parking
lots can exercise price discrimination. They characterize the market equilibrium and
the social optimum. They find that since privately operated garages exercise market
power, the equilibrium is not efficient.
In the literature, the shopping mall parking is a relatively new subject which is
introduced by Hasker and Inci (2014). Ersoy, Hasker, and Inci (2016) extend the
base model of Hasker and Inci (2014) by analyzing the pricing scheme of a shopping
mall when customers make modal choices. Customers choose either car or public
transportation to get to the mall. In their model, first, the city decides on the bus
fare, then the mall decides on the parking fee and the price of the good. Finally,
customers decide to go to the mall or not, and the mode of transportation if they go.
They find that in equilibrium, the mall sets the parking fee less than the marginal
cost of parking. They extend their analysis by investigating other cases. They find
that when the mall provides shuttle service for free or sells multiple goods, parking
is still a loss leader.
Inci, Lindsey, and Oz (2018) extend the base model of Hasker and Inci (2014) by
investigating the pricing scheme of a retailer when customers choose between valet
parking and self-parking. The retail sets the prices of both types of parking as well
as the price of the good. As in the model of Hasker and Inci (2014), customers are
risk-averse and there is a probability that customers who visit the mall may not
find the good they want and leave the store empty-handed. Inci, Lindsey, and Oz
(2018) characterize the market equilibrium as well as the social optimum and find
that the retailer provides self-parking for free and embeds the cost of self-parking in
the price of the good in both the market equilibrium and the social optimum. On
the other hand, they find that the price of valet parking may be above or below its
cost in equilibrium.
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Inan, Inci, and Lindsey (2019) analyze spillover parking generated by a retailer.
They indicate that drivers who go to popular areas may prefer parking in the neigh-
borhood to avoid expensive parking fees while causing negative externalities in the
region since they generate more traffic. In their model, the retailer decides on the
parking lot capacity and sets the parking fee. Some customers walk and others
drive. Drivers can use either the parking lot of the retailer or the street to park.
The authors investigate different policies in addressing spillover parking and find
that the effectiveness of policies depends on congestion, the number of shoppers,
and the market power of the retailer.
Guven, Inci, and Russo (Forthcoming) study competition among retailers. They set
up a model in which customers are informed about the exact prices and features
of the goods only if they go to the mall, and this is costly to the customer. They
indicate that since there is a search cost for customers, it is more beneficial for
retailers to concentrate under a mall. They point out that the mall can affect
the prices of the goods, and hence it can diminish competition between retailers.
They show that the concentration of retailers under a mall leads to higher prices.
Moreover, they find that the mall uses parking as a loss leader.
Price discrimination has been extensively studied in the literature of industrial or-
ganization while it has not been a focal point in parking literature. Even so, there
are some crucial studies on price discrimination in parking models. Lindsey and
West (1997) study the use of parking coupons by downtown retailers. They analyze
the effects of spatial price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets.
In their model, customers are either from downtown or suburban. Suburban cus-
tomers have more price elastic demand since the travel cost is higher for them and
they are closer to suburban shopping centers. Lindsey and West (1997) indicate that
discrimination may be exercised in favor of suburban consumers and against down-
town consumers. In order to apply price discrimination, parking discount coupons
are used since in general, suburban consumers are coupon users while downtown
customers are not. They find that if the stores participate in the downtown parking
coupon program collectively, the program is beneficial. Otherwise, the stores are
better off if they do not participate.
In the parking literature, there are several empirical papers on price discrimination.
De Nijs (2012) examines the impact of a large horizontal merger on the price menus
of the parking garages. He finds that the presentation of a large horizontal merger
causes more discounts on a long duration and more price discrimination. Lin and
Wang (2015) examine competition and price discrimination in parking garages. They
find that competition limits firms from implementing price discrimination.
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3. HASKER-INCI MODEL: ONE TYPE OF GOOD AND
CUSTOMER
In the base model of Hasker and Inci (2014), there is a risk-neutral monopolist
shopping mall which sells one good at a price P ≥ 0 that has no marginal cost,
cgood = 0. The mall provides a parking lot to its customers, at a fee t which has a
marginal cost clot > 0.
Customers can go to the mall only by car and they can only park at the mall’s
parking lot. They are strictly risk-averse, have the same utility function u(.), the
same initial wealth w> 0, and the same reservation value r > 0. Each customer have
a valuation v ∈ [0, v¯] for the good which has the cumulative distribution function
F (v) and density f(v). It is assumed that F (v) has the standard monotone hazard
rate property. Hence the mall’s objective function is concave. Moreover, there is a
probability ρ∈ (0,1) that the customer may find the good. This probability can also
be considered as the probability that the customer likes the good enough to buy,
that is, v ≥ P .
A customer decides to go to the mall if and only if the expected utility of going to
the mall is greater or equal to the expected utility of not going to the mall. That
is, a customer goes to the mall if and only if
ρu(w+v−P − t) + (1−ρ)u(w− t)≥ u(w+ r). (3.1)
The customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has the valuation
v˜(P,t),
v˜(P,t)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ)u(w− t)
ρ
)
−w+P + t. (3.2)
Therefore,1
v˜P = 1, (3.3)
1v˜x stands for ∂v˜/∂x and ux stands for ∂u/∂x.
6
and
v˜t = 1 +
(1−ρ)
ρ
ut(w− t)
ut(w+ v˜−P − t) ≥
1
ρ
. (3.4)
There are 1−F (v˜) customers and the mall’s profit is Π(P,t),
Π(P,t) = (1−F (v˜))(ρP + t− clot). (3.5)
Hasker and Inci (2014) first solve the unconstrained optimization problem and find
that in equilibrium, it must be that t∗ =−r. That is, the mall gives subsidy to the
customers for coming to the mall since they take the risk of not finding the good.
Since this is not applicable, the authors solve the constrained optimization problem:
The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P and t, subject to the rationality
constraint ρP +t−clot≥ 0, and non-negativity constraints P,t≥ 0.2 The Lagrangian
function is
L(P,t) = (1−F (v˜))(ρP + t− clot) +λ1(ρP + t− clot) +λ2P +λ3t, (3.6)
where λ1,λ2, and λ3 are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P and t,3
LP = ρ(1−F (v˜))−f(v˜)v˜P (ρP + t− clot) +λ1ρ+λ2. (3.7)
Lt = 1−F (v˜)−f(v˜)v˜t(ρP + t− clot) +λ1 +λ3. (3.8)
Equating the first-order condition in (3.7) to zero, and using (3.3),
ρ(1−F (v˜)) +λ1ρ+λ2 = f(v˜)(ρP + t− clot). (3.9)
Notice that the expression ρP + t− clot cannot be zero, since ρ(1−F (v˜)) is greater
than zero. Therefore, by complementary slackness, λ1 = 0. Then, (3.9) becomes
1−F (v˜) = f(v˜)(ρP + t− clot)−λ2
ρ
. (3.10)
Notice that if v˜t = 1/ρ, then by (3.4), v˜ = P . But then, from the equation (3.2),
2Note that taking the individual rationality (IR) constraint into account is not necessary at this point since
customers with valuation v˜ or higher are already considered to be going to the mall. However, throughout
this thesis, we include IR conditions in the Lagrangian function for the sake of comprehensiveness.
3Lx stands for ∂L/∂x.
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it must be that in equilibrium, t∗ = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜t > 1/ρ. Hence,
1−F (v˜) = f(v˜)(ρP + t− clot)−λ2
ρ
< f(v˜)v˜t(ρP + t− clot)− v˜tλ2. (3.11)
Since v˜tλ2 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜)< f(v˜)v˜t(ρP + t− clot). (3.12)
Equating the first-order condition in (3.8) to zero and using λ1 = 0,
1−F (v˜) = f(v˜)v˜t(ρP + t− clot)−λ3. (3.13)
Hence, by (3.12), it must be that λ3 > 0. But then, by complementary slackness,
in equilibrium, t∗ = 0. Then, since ρP + t− clot > 0 and clot > 0, P cannot be zero.
Then, by complementary slackness, λ2 = 0. Therefore, by (3.10), in equilibrium,
P ∗ = 1−F (v˜)
f(v˜) +
clot
ρ
. (3.14)
Notice that the first term on the right-hand side is the monopoly markup, which is
the inverse of the hazard rate. Therefore, by assumption, it decreases as P increases.
Hence, the equilibrium price is unique. This solution also shows that the price
is determined based on the ratio of the marginal cost of the parking lot to the
probability of buying the good. As the probability of buying the good increases, the
price decreases. Moreover, in equilibrium, parking is free for every customer and its
cost is embedded in the price.
Hasker and Inci (2014) briefly mention the cases where there are different types of
customers and each type is interested in only one type of good. In this thesis, we
also examine these cases in detail.
In the rest of this thesis, all assumptions in the base model of Hasker and Inci (2014)
are retained, except otherwise noted.
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4. PRICE DISCRIMINATION MODELS WITH TWO TYPES OF
CUSTOMERS
In this chapter, we analyze the pricing strategy of a monopolist mall when it can
price discriminate. We assume that the necessary conditions for price discrimination
are satisfied. That is, there are different market segments that the mall can identify
and the resale of the goods is not allowed.
There are two types of customers, Type 1 and Type 2. Customers are identical
within each type. Type 1 customer has a valuation v1 ∈ [0, v¯1] and pays P1 ≥ 0 for
the good and t1 for the parking lot. Type 2 customer has a valuation v2 ∈ [0, v¯2]
and pays P2 ≥ 0 for the good and t2 for the parking lot.
4.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination
In first-degree price discrimination, the monopoly knows the maximum price each
customer is willing to pay and charges them accordingly. Even though first-degree
price discrimination is relatively difficult to implement in real life, there are com-
panies that collect data about customers’ personal information such as gender, age,
district, and past purchases to predict customers’ maximum willingness to pay for
the good. In this setting, the mall can implement this type of price discrimination
by providing an app for its customers that would collect personal data, and then
the mall can set a specific price for the good for each customer.
In this section, we analyze the pricing strategy of a monopolist mall when it imple-
ments first-degree price discrimination. We assume that there is one type of good.1
Suppose that the mall can perfectly differentiate the customers and their willingness
1The case of two types of goods and two types of customers is examined in Section 4.2.
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to pay for the good. Therefore, the mall can set different parking fees and prices for
the good for each type of customer.
Type 1 customer goes to the mall if and only if her expected utility of going to the
mall is greater or equal to her expected utility of not going to the mall. That is, she
goes to the mall if and only if
ρu(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r). (4.1)
Type 1 is indifferent between going to the mall and staying at home if she has the
valuation v˜1(P1, t1),
v˜1(P1, t1)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ)u(w− t1)
ρ
)
−w+P1 + t1. (4.2)
Therefore,2
v˜1,P1 = 1, (4.3)
and
v˜1,t1 = 1 +
(1−ρ)
ρ
ut1(w− t1)
ut1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
≥ 1
ρ
. (4.4)
Notice that if v˜1,t1 = 1/ρ, then v˜1 = P1. But then, from the equation (4.2), it must
be that in equilibrium, t∗1 =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ.
Similarly, Type 2 goes to the mall if and only if his expected utility of going to the
mall is greater or equal to his expected utility of not going to the mall. That is, he
goes to the mall if and only if
ρu(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r). (4.5)
Type 2 is indifferent between going to the mall and staying at home if he has the
valuation v˜2(P2, t2),
v˜2(P2, t2)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ)u(w− t2)
ρ
)
−w+P2 + t2. (4.6)
Therefore,
v˜2,P2 = 1, (4.7)
and
v˜2,t2 = 1 +
(1−ρ)
ρ
ut2(w− t2)
ut2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
≥ 1
ρ
. (4.8)
2v˜x,y stands for ∂v˜x/∂y.
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Notice that if v˜2,t2 = 1/ρ, then v˜2 = P2. But then, from the equation (4.6), it must
be that in equilibrium, t∗2 =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ.
Therefore, there are 1−F (v˜1) customers of Type 1 and 1−F (v˜2) customers of Type
2. The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, t1, t2), which is the summation of the profits it
receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]
+[1−F (v˜2)][ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot].
(4.9)
The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2, subject to individual
rationality constraints of each type of customer,
(IR1) : ρu(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r), (4.10)
(IR2) : ρu(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r), (4.11)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ(P1− cgood)+ t1− clot ≥ 0, ρ(P2− cgood)+ t2− clot ≥ 0, P1,P2, t1, t2 ≥ 0. (4.12)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]
+ [1−F (v˜2)][ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]
+λ1[ρu(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ)u(w− t1)−u(w+ r)]
+λ2[ρu(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ)u(w− t2)−u(w+ r)]
+λ3[ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot] +λ4[ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]
+λ5P1 +λ6P2 +λ7t1 +λ8t2
(4.13)
where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5,λ6,λ7, and λ8 are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2,
LP1 = ρ[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]
+λ1ρuP1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1) +λ3ρ+λ5.
(4.14)
LP2 = ρ[1−F (v˜2)]−f(v˜2)v˜2,P2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]
+λ2ρuP2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1) +λ4ρ+λ6.
(4.15)
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Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]
+λ1[ρut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ)ut1(w− t1)]
+λ3 +λ7.
(4.16)
Lt2 = 1−F (v˜2)−f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]
+λ2[ρut2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ)ut2(w− t2)]
+λ4 +λ8.
(4.17)
To find the equilibrium parking fee and price of the good for Type 1, first we equate
the first-order condition in (4.14) to zero and use v˜1,P1 = 1,
ρ[1−F (v˜1)] +λ3ρ+λ5 = f(v˜1)[ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]. (4.18)
Notice that the expression ρ(P1− cgood)+ t1− clot cannot be zero, since ρ[1−F (v˜1)]
is greater than zero. Then, it must be that λ3 = 0, since by complementary slackness
condition, λ3[ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot] = 0. Therefore, by (4.18),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]−λ5
ρ
. (4.19)
Since v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]−λ5
ρ
< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]− v˜1,t1λ5.
(4.20)
Since v˜1,t1λ5 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜1)< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]. (4.21)
Equating the first-order condition in (4.16) to zero,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]
−λ1[ρut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ)ut1(w− t1)]−λ7.
(4.22)
Then, by (4.4), (4.22) becomes
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ(P1− cgood) + t1− clot]−λ7. (4.23)
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Then, by (4.21), λ7 > 0. Hence, by complementary slackness condition, t∗1 = 0.
Then, it must be that P1 > 0, since the expression ρ(P1−cgood)+ t1−clot cannot be
negative. Therefore, by complementary slackness condition, λ5 = 0 and by (4.19),
in equilibrium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot
ρ
+ cgood, and t∗1 = 0. (4.24)
To find the equilibrium parking fee and price of the good for Type 2, similar steps
are followed:
Equating the first-order condition in (4.15) to zero and using v˜2,P2 = 1,
ρ[1−F (v˜2)] +λ4ρ+λ6 = f(v˜2)[ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]. (4.25)
Notice that the expression ρ(P2− cgood)+ t2− clot cannot be zero, since ρ[1−F (v˜2)]
is greater than zero. Then, it must be that λ4 = 0, since by complementary slackness
condition, λ4[ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot] = 0. Therefore, by (4.25),
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]−λ6
ρ
. (4.26)
Since v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]−λ6
ρ
< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]− v˜2,t2λ6.
(4.27)
Since v˜2,t2λ6 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜2)< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]. (4.28)
Equating the first-order condition in (4.17) to zero,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]
−λ2[ρut2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ)ut2(w− t2)]−λ8.
(4.29)
Then, by (4.8), (4.29) becomes
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ(P2− cgood) + t2− clot]−λ8. (4.30)
Then, by (2.28), λ8 > 0. Hence, by complementary slackness condition, t∗2 = 0.
Then, it must be that P2 > 0, since the expression ρ(P2−cgood)+ t2−clot cannot be
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negative. Therefore by complementary slackness condition, λ6 = 0 and by (4.26), in
equilibrium,
P ∗2 =
1−F (v˜2)
f(v˜2)
+ clot
ρ
+ cgood, and t∗2 = 0. (4.31)
Under first-degree price discrimination where the mall can perfectly differentiate
between Type 1 and Type 2 customers, the mall can set two prices, P ∗1 and P ∗2 , for
the same good. We find that in equilibrium, these prices are unique. Also, parking
is free for both Type 1 and Type 2 customers. Moreover, the cost of the parking lot
is embedded in the prices of the good.
The prices of the good depend positively on the ratio of the marginal cost of the
parking lot to the probability of finding the good and depend negatively on the
probability of finding the good. For a fixed marginal cost of the good and the
parking lot, as the probability of finding the good decreases, the equilibrium prices
of the good increase. Hence, as the good becomes more difficult to find, customers
pay more for the good.
Since ρ can be thought of as the probability of buying the good, these equilibrium
prices also mean that as customers become less likely to buy the good, they pay
more for the good. Hence, the mall charges the customers more as their likeliness of
buying the good decreases and charges them less as they get more likely to buy the
good. This could be interpreted as the following: the mall aims to attract customers
with a higher probability of buying the good by offering them a lower price while
making customers with a lower probability of buying the good pay more for the
good.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 1. Under first-degree price discrimination where the mall can perfectly
differentiate between Type 1 and Type 2, the prices are unique and cover the cost of
the parking lot. Moreover, as customers become less (more) likely to buy the good,
they pay more (less) for the good.
4.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In second-degree price discrimination, the mall knows that there are different types
of customers but does not know which customer is which type. Hence, the mall offers
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the goods in different quality or quantity. For instance, there may be higher-income
and lower-income customers and the mall may sell luxury and regular watches or ser-
vice the customers in two restaurants such that one has a nice view and comfortable
seats while the other one does not.
In this section, we analyze the pricing strategy of the mall when it implements
second-degree price discrimination. We assume that there are two types of cus-
tomers, Type 1 and Type 2, and two goods, Good 1 and Good 2. Good 1 has a
marginal cost cgood1 > 0 and the probability of finding it is ρ1 ∈ (0,1) while Good
2 has a marginal cost cgood2 > 0 and the probability of finding it is ρ2 ∈ (0,1). The
marginal costs of the parking lots for Good 1 and Good 2 buyers are clot1 > 0 and
clot2 > 0, respectively.3 Customers who are interested in Good 1 pay t1 while cus-
tomers who are interested in Good 2 pay t2 for the parking lot. The mall can provide
parking vouchers to implement this.
In this section, we assume that the mall cannot distinguish the type of customers.
Therefore, while solving for the optimal prices, the mall also imposes incentive com-
patibility conditions in order to make customers reveal their true types. Following
Stiglitz (1977), we examine this case for two situations: (i) Two types are differ-
ing only in the probability of finding (or buying) the good, and (ii) two types are
differing in their attitudes towards risk.
4.2.1 Types are differing in probability of buying the good
In this model, customers differ only in their probabilities of finding (or buying) the
good. For instance, there can be fastidious and easily pleased customers who differ
in probability of buying the good. The mall knows that customers have different
types but cannot identify the type of a given customer.
Type 1 customer goes to the mall if
ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r). (4.32)
Type 1 customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has a valuation
3For instance, the parking lot of a certain type of good’s buyers may need a larger space, hence it may have
a higher marginal cost.
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v˜1(P1, t1),
v˜1(P1, t1)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)
ρ1
)
−w+P1 + t1. (4.33)
Therefore,4
v˜1,P1 = 1, (4.34)
and
v˜1,t1 = 1 +
(1−ρ1)
ρ1
ut1(w− t1)
ut1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
≥ 1
ρ1
. (4.35)
Notice that if v˜1,t1 = 1/ρ1, then v˜1 = P1. But then, from the equation (4.33), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗1 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1.
Similarly, Type 2 customer goes to the mall if
ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r). (4.36)
Type 2 customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has a valuation
v˜2(P2, t2),
v˜2(P2, t2)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)
ρ2
)
−w+P2 + t2. (4.37)
Therefore,5
v˜2,P2 = 1, (4.38)
and
v˜2,t2 = 1 +
(1−ρ2)
ρ2
ut2(w− t2)
ut2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
≥ 1
ρ2
. (4.39)
Notice that if v˜2,t2 = 1/ρ2, then v˜2 = P2. But then, from the equation (4.37), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗2 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, t1, t2), which is the summation of the profits it receives
from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)]
[
ρ1
(
P1− cgood1
)
+ t1− clot1
]
+ [1−F (v˜2)]
[
ρ2
(
P2− cgood2
)
+ t2− clot2
]
.
(4.40)
4Note that v˜1,P2 = 0 and v˜1,t2 = 0.
5Note that v˜2,P1 = 0 and v˜2,t1 = 0.
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The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2, subject to individual
rationality constraints of each type,
(IR1) : ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r), (4.41)
(IR2) : ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r), (4.42)
and incentive compatibility constraints of each type,
(IC1) : ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)
≥ ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2),
(4.43)
(IC2) : ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)
≥ ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1),
(4.44)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ≥ 0, ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ≥ 0,
P1,P2, t1, t2 ≥ 0.
(4.45)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ [1−F (v˜2)][ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ1[ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)−u(w+ r)]
+λ2[ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)−u(w+ r)]
+λ3[ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)
−ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2)− (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)]
+λ4[ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)
−ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1)− (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)]
+λ5[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ6[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ7P1 +λ8P2 +λ9t1 +λ10t2
(4.46)
where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5,λ6,λ7,λ8,λ9, and λ10 are Lagrangian multipliers.
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Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2,
LP1 = ρ1[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ (λ1 +λ3−λ4)ρ1uP1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1) +λ5ρ1 +λ7.
(4.47)
LP2 = ρ2[1−F (v˜2)]−f(v˜2)v˜2,P2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+ (λ2 +λ4−λ3)ρ2uP2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1) +λ6ρ2 +λ8.
(4.48)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ (λ1 +λ3−λ4)[ρ1ut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ut1(w− t1)]
+λ5 +λ9.
(4.49)
Lt2 = 1−F (v˜2)−f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+ (λ2 +λ4−λ3)[ρ2ut2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)ut2(w− t2)]
+λ6 +λ10.
(4.50)
To find the equilibrium parking fee and price of the good for Type 1, first we equate
LP1 to zero and use v˜1,P1 = 1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5ρ1−λ7
ρ1
. (4.51)
Notice that the expression ρ1(P1 − cgood1) + t1 − clot1 cannot be zero. Thus, by
complementary slackness, λ5 = 0. Therefore, (4.51) becomes
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7
ρ1
. (4.52)
Since v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7
ρ1
< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7v˜1,t1 .
(4.53)
Since λ7v˜1,t1 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜1)< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]. (4.54)
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Equating Lt1 to zero and using (4.35),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ9. (4.55)
Then, by (4.54), λ9 cannot be zero. Then, by complementary slackness, t∗1 = 0.
Then, P1 cannot be zero since the expression ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 cannot be
negative. Hence, by complementary slackness, λ7 = 0. Then, by (4.52), in equilib-
rium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot1
ρ1
+ cgood1 , and t
∗
1 = 0. (4.56)
To find the equilibrium parking fee and price of the good for Type 2, similar steps
are followed:
Equating LP2 to zero and using v˜2,P2 = 1,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6ρ2−λ8
ρ2
. (4.57)
Notice that the expression ρ2(P2 − cgood2) + t2 − clot2 cannot be zero. Thus, by
complementary slackness, λ6 = 0. Therefore, (4.57) becomes
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8
ρ2
. (4.58)
Since v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8
ρ2
< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8v˜2,t2 .
(4.59)
Since λ8v˜2,t2 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜2)< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]. (4.60)
Equating Lt2 to zero and using (4.39),
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ10. (4.61)
Then, by (4.60), λ10 cannot be zero. Then, by complementary slackness, t∗2 = 0.
Then, P2 cannot be zero since the expression ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 cannot be
negative. Hence, by complementary slackness, λ8 = 0. Then, by (4.58), in equilib-
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rium,
P ∗2 =
1−F (v˜2)
f(v˜2)
+ clot2
ρ2
+ cgood2 , and t
∗
2 = 0. (4.62)
Therefore, under second-degree price discrimination where the types of customers
have the same utility functions but different probabilities of finding (or buying) the
goods, parking is free for both Type 1 and Type 2, and the cost of the parking lot
is embedded in the prices of Good 1 and Good 2.
Moreover, the prices of Good 1 and Good 2 are unique. For each good, the price
of the good depends negatively on the probability of finding the good. For a fixed
marginal cost of good and parking lot, as the probability of finding (or buying) the
good decreases, the equilibrium price of that good increases. Hence, as customers
become less likely to buy the good, they pay more for that good. Thus, the mall
aims to attract customers with a higher probability of buying the good by offering
them a lower price while making customers with a lower probability of buying the
good pay more for the good.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 2. Under second-degree price discrimination where customers differ in
their probabilities of finding the good, the prices of Good 1 and Good 2 are unique
and cover the costs of the parking lots. Moreover, as customers become less (more)
likely to buy the good, they pay more (less) for the good.
In this model, the types are not observable to the mall. However, the mall can set
the prices such that every customer reveals their own types. The equilibrium prices
of the goods are not affected by the probability of finding the other good. This
makes sense since the marginal customer’s valuation of a good does not depend
on the price of the other good. In addition, in this section we allow the costs of
the goods and parking lots to be different for each type. Even though this does
not change the analysis, we show that in equilibrium, the price of a good does not
depend on the cost of the other good or the cost of the parking lot reserved for the
other type of customer.
4.2.2 Types are differing in their attitudes towards risk
In this section, we study the pricing strategy of the mall when customers have
different utility functions and degree of risk-aversion. Factors such as gender, age,
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marital status, and health condition may affect a person’s degree of risk-aversion.
For instance, parents can be more risk-averse than other people. In this model, the
mall knows that customers have different attitudes towards risk but cannot identify
the type of a given customer.
In our model, Type 1 and Type 2 customers have utility functions u1 and u2, re-
spectively. Without loss of generality, we let Type 1 customer be more risk-averse
than Type 2 customer. Thus, u1 = h◦u2, for some concave function h.
Type 1 goes to the mall if
ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)≥ u1(w+ r). (4.63)
The marginal customer of Type 1 who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜1(P1, t1),
v˜1(P1, t1)≡ u−11
(
u1(w+ r)− (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)
ρ1
)
−w+P1 + t1. (4.64)
Therefore,6,7
v˜1,P1 = 1, (4.65)
and
v˜1,t1 = 1 +
(1−ρ1)
ρ1
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
≥ 1
ρ1
. (4.66)
Notice that if v˜1,t1 = 1/ρ1, then v˜1 = P1. But then, from the equation (4.64), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗1 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1.
Similarly, Type 2 goes to the mall if
ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)≥ u2(w+ r). (4.67)
The marginal customer of Type 2 who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜2(P2, t2),
v˜2(P2, t2)≡ u−12
(
u2(w+ r)− (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)
ρ2
)
−w+P2 + t2. (4.68)
6ux,y stands for ∂ux/∂y
7Note that v˜1,P2 = 0 and v˜1,t2 = 0.
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Therefore,8
v˜2,P2 = 1, (4.69)
and
v˜2,t2 = 1 +
(1−ρ2)
ρ2
u2,t2(w− t2)
u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
≥ 1
ρ2
. (4.70)
Notice that if v˜2,t2 = 1/ρ2, then v˜2 = P2. But then, from the equation (4.68), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗2 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, t1, t2), which is the summation of the profits it receives
from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)]
[
ρ1
(
P1− cgood1
)
+ t1− clot1
]
+ [1−F (v˜2)]
[
ρ2
(
P2− cgood2
)
+ t2− clot2
]
.
(4.71)
The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2, subject to individual
rationality constraints of each type,
(IR1) : ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)≥ u1(w+ r), (4.72)
(IR2) : ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)≥ u2(w+ r), (4.73)
and incentive compatibility constraints of each type,
(IC1) : ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)
≥ ρ2u1(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u1(w− t2),
(4.74)
(IC2) : ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)
≥ ρ1u2(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u2(w− t1),
(4.75)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ≥ 0, ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ≥ 0,
P1,P2, t1, t2 ≥ 0.
(4.76)
8Note that v˜2,P1 = 0 and v˜2,t1 = 0.
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The Lagrangian function is
L(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ [1−F (v˜2)][ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ1[ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)−u1(w+ r)]
+λ2[ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)−u2(w+ r)]
+λ3[ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)
−ρ2u1(w+v2−P2− t2)− (1−ρ2)u1(w− t2)]
+λ4[ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)
−ρ1u2(w+v1−P1− t1)− (1−ρ1)u2(w− t1)]
+λ5[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ6[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ7P1 +λ8P2 +λ9t1 +λ10t2
(4.77)
where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5,λ6,λ7,λ8,λ9, and λ10 are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2,
LP1 = ρ1[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ (λ1 +λ3)ρ1u1,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1)
−λ4ρ1u2,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1) +λ5ρ1 +λ7.
(4.78)
LP2 = ρ2[1−F (v˜2)]−f(v˜2)v˜2,P2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+ (λ2 +λ4)ρ2u2,P2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1)
−λ3ρ2u1,P2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1) +λ6ρ2 +λ8.
(4.79)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ (λ1 +λ3) [ρ1u1,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u1,t1(w− t1)]
−λ4[ρ1u2,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u2,t1(w− t1)]
+λ5 +λ9.
(4.80)
Lt2 = 1−F (v˜2)−f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2
(
P2− cgood2
)
+ t2− clot2 ]
+ (λ2 +λ4) [ρ2u2,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)u2,t2(w− t2)]
−λ3[ρ2u1,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)u1,t2(w− t2)]
+λ6 +λ10.
(4.81)
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First, we find the equilibrium parking fee and price of the good for Type 1. Equating
LP1 to zero and using v˜1,P1 = 1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5ρ1−λ7
ρ1
. (4.82)
Notice that the expression ρ1(P1− cgood1)+ t1− clot1 cannot be zero since 1−F (v˜1)
is strictly positive. Thus, by complementary slackness, λ5 is zero. Then, (4.82)
becomes
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7
ρ1
. (4.83)
Since v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7
ρ1
< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7v˜1,t1 .
(4.84)
Since λ7v˜1,t1 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜1)< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]. (4.85)
Equating Lt1 to zero and using (4.66),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ4[ρ1u2,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u2,t1(w− t1)]
−λ9.
(4.86)
Again by (4.66),
ρ1u2,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u2,t1(w− t1)
= (1−ρ1)
[
u2,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
−u2,t1(w− t1)
]
. (4.87)
We will show that the right-hand side of (4.87) is strictly positive. That is, u1,t1(w−
t1)/u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)> u2,t1(w− t1)/u2,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1).9
9Notice that u1,t1(w− t1)/u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1) is the marginal rate of substitution of Type 1 customer
while u2,t1(w− t1)/u2,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1) is the marginal rate of substitution of Type 2 customer.
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Since u1 = h◦u2 for some concave function h,10
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
= ht1(u2(w− t1))u2,t1(w− t1)
ht1(u2(w+ v˜1−P1− t1))u2,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
. (4.88)
Since u2 is an increasing function and v˜1 > P1, u2(w+ v˜1−P1− t1) > u2(w− t1).
Also, since h is a concave function, its derivative is a decreasing function. Therefore,
ht1(u2(w− t1))> ht1(u2(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)). Since the derivative of the function u2 is
positive,
ht1(u2(w− t1))u2,t1(w− t1)
ht1(u2(w+ v˜1−P1− t1))u2,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
>
u2,t1(w− t1)
u2,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
. (4.89)
Therefore, (4.87) is strictly positive.
Hence, by (4.85), λ9 is strictly positive. By complementary slackness, t∗1 = 0. Then,
since the expression ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 cannot be negative, P1 > 0. Hence,
by complementary slackness, λ7 = 0. Then, by (4.83), in equilibrium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot1
ρ1
+ cgood1 and t
∗
1 = 0. (4.90)
We now find the equilibrium price of the good and the parking fee for Type 2
customer. Equating LP2 to zero and using v˜2,P2 = 1,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6ρ2−λ8
ρ2
. (4.91)
Notice that the expression ρ2(P2− cgood2)+ t2− clot2 cannot be zero since 1−F (v˜2)
is strictly positive. Thus, by complementary slackness, λ6 is zero. Then, (4.91)
becomes
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8
ρ2
. (4.92)
Since v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8
ρ2
< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8v˜2,t2 .
(4.93)
Since λ8v˜2,t2 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜2)< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]. (4.94)
10hx stands for ∂h/∂x.
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Equating Lt2 to zero and using (4.70),
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2
(
P2− cgood2
)
+ t2− clot2 ]
+λ3[ρ2u1,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)u1,t2(w− t2)]
−λ10.
(4.95)
Again by (4.70),
ρ2u1,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)u1,t2(w− t2)
= (1−ρ2)
[
u1,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)
u2,t2(w− t2)
u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
−u1,t2(w− t2)
]
. (4.96)
We will show that the right-hand side of (4.96) is strictly negative. That is, u1,t2(w−
t2)/u1,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)> u2,t2(w− t2)/u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2).
Since u1 = h◦u2 for some concave function h,
u1,t2(w− t2)
u1,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
= ht2(u2(w− t2))u2,t2(w− t2)
ht2(u2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2))u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
. (4.97)
Since u2 is an increasing function and v˜2 > P2, u2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2) > u2(w− t2).
Since h is a concave function, its derivative is a decreasing function. Therefore,
ht2(u2(w− t2))> ht2(u2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)). Since the derivative of the function u2 is
positive,
ht2(u2(w− t2))u2,t2(w− t2)
ht2(u2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2))u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
>
u2,t2(w− t2)
u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
. (4.98)
Hence, (4.96) is strictly negative. Then, combining (4.94) and (4.95), λ3 and λ10
cannot be both zero at the same time. Therefore, there are infinitely many optimal
solutions of the parking fee t2 and the price of Good 2. These solutions include the
cases where the mall charges a strictly positive parking fee as well as the case where
it charges zero parking fee.
If the mall wants to implement the solution where it charges the less risk-averse
customer with a strictly positive parking fee, then IC1 must hold with equality.
That is, the mall must make Type 1 customers -more risk-averse customers- indif-
ferent between buying Good 1 and Good 2. In that case, P ∗2 = (1−F (v˜2))/f(v˜2) +
λ8/(ρ2f(v˜2)) + (−t∗2 + clot2)/ρ2 + cgood2 . Then, the price of Good 2 may be zero or
strictly positive. If the mall wants to sell Good 2 for free, then it must charge the
parking lot t∗2 > clot2 +ρ2cgood2 . Then, the upper limit for t∗2 will be set by IC1. If
it sets P ∗2 > 0, then it must set t∗2 < ρ2
(
[1−F (v˜2)]/f(v˜2) + cgood2
)
+ clot2 .
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On the other hand, if the mall implements a solution where t∗2 = 0, then P ∗2 =
(1−F (v˜2))/f(v˜2) +λ8/(ρ2f(v˜2)) + (clot2/ρ2) + cgood2 . And since P ∗2 > 0, and hence
λ8 = 0, it must be that P ∗2 = [1−F (v˜2)]/f(v˜2)+(clot2/ρ2)+ cgood2 . In that case, P ∗2
is unique.
Under second-degree price discrimination where customers have different attitudes
towards risk and probabilities of finding (or buying) the goods, parking is free for
Type 1, who is more risk-averse than Type 2. Thus, the mall has an incentive to
insure the more risk-averse customer for the risk of not finding the good. The cost
of the parking lot of Type 1 is embedded in the prices of Good 1. Moreover, the
price of Good 1 is unique and depends negatively on the probability of finding the
good. As Type 1 customers become less likely to buy the good, they pay more for
that good.
Even though the mall can provide free parking for Type 2 as well, it is not the only
optimal solution for the mall. Hence, the mall is flexible in embedding the cost of
parking lot reserved for Type 2 customers into the price of Good 2.
If the mall chooses to provide parking for free for Type 2 as well, then the optimal
price it can set is unique. In that case, the price of Good 2 depends negatively on
the probability of finding the good. As Type 2 customers become less likely to buy
the good, they pay more for that good.
On the other hand, if the mall chooses to charge the parking lot of Type 2 with
a positive fee, then there are infinitely many optimal prices for Good 2 it can set,
including selling Good 2 for free. In that case, the mall must set the prices such that
Type 1 customers are indifferent between revealing their true types and behaving
as if they are Type 2. The negative relationship between the price of the good and
the probability of buying the good still holds except when the price is zero.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 3. Under second-degree price discrimination where customers differ in
their degree of risk-aversion, the price of the good that the more risk-averse customer
buys is unique and covers the costs of the parking lots. Moreover, as the more risk-
averse customer becomes less (more) likely to buy the good, she pays more (less)
for the good. On the other hand, these results may not hold for the less risk-averse
customer.
The results also show that the equilibrium prices of the goods are not affected by
the probability of finding the other good, the cost of the other good, and the cost
of the parking lot reserved for the other type of customer.
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4.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
In third-degree price discrimination, the mall can separate the customers into groups
and charge each group differently. For instance, the mall can offer children or student
discounts. In this type of price discrimination, the mall can verify the groups of the
customers, for instance by asking for an identity card.
In this section, we analyze the pricing strategy of a monopolist mall when it im-
plements third-degree price discrimination. In this model, there are two groups of
customers, Type 1 and Type 2, who are interested in the same certain good but have
different utility functions. Type 1 and Type 2 customers decide to buy the good with
ρ1 ∈ (0,1) and ρ2 ∈ (0,1) probabilities, respectively. Since the mall can distinguish
the types of the customers, it can charge different prices and parking fees. Also, we
assume that the marginal cost of the good is the same for both groups since there
is one good. However, we assume that the marginal cost of the parking lot may be
different from each other. We let clot1 and clot2 be the marginal costs of the parking
lots of Type 1 and Type 2 customers, respectively.
Type 1 goes to the mall if
ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)≥ u1(w+ r). (4.99)
The marginal customer of Type 1 who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜1(P1, t1),
v˜1(P1, t1)≡ u−11
(
u1(w+ r)− (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)
ρ1
)
−w+P1 + t1. (4.100)
Therefore,11
v˜1,P1 = 1, (4.101)
and
v˜1,t1 = 1 +
(1−ρ1)
ρ1
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
≥ 1
ρ1
. (4.102)
Notice that if v˜1,t1 = 1/ρ1, then v˜1 = P1. But then, from the equation (4.100), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗1 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1.
11Note that v˜1,P2 = 0 and v˜1,t2 = 0.
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Type 2 goes to the mall if
ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)≥ u2(w+ r). (4.103)
The marginal customer of Type 2 who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜2(P2, t2),
v˜2(P2, t2)≡ u−12
(
u2(w+ r)− (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)
ρ2
)
−w+P2 + t2. (4.104)
Therefore,12
v˜2,P2 = 1, (4.105)
and
v˜2,t2 = 1 +
(1−ρ2)
ρ2
u2,t2(w− t2)
u2,t2(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
≥ 1
ρ2
. (4.106)
Notice that if v˜2,t2 = 1/ρ2, then v˜2 = P2. But then, from the equation (4.104), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗2 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, t1, t2), which is the summation of the profits it receives
from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)]
[
ρ1
(
P1− cgood
)
+ t1− clot1
]
+ [1−F (v˜2)]
[
ρ2
(
P2− cgood
)
+ t2− clot2
]
.
(4.107)
The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2, subject to individual
rationality constraints of each type,
(IR1) : ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)≥ u1(w+ r), (4.108)
(IR2) : ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)≥ u2(w+ r), (4.109)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ≥ 0, ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ≥ 0,
P1,P2, t1, t2 ≥ 0.
(4.110)
12Note that v˜2,P1 = 0 and v˜2,t1 = 0.
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The Lagrangian function is
L(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]
+ [1−F (v˜2)][ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ1[ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)−u1(w+ r)]
+λ2[ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)−u2(w+ r)]
+λ3[ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ] +λ4[ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ5P1 +λ6P2 +λ7t1 +λ8t2
(4.111)
where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5,λ6,λ7, and λ8 are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2,
LP1 = ρ1[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ1ρ1u1,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1) +λ3ρ1 +λ5.
(4.112)
LP2 = ρ2[1−F (v˜2)]−f(v˜2)v˜2,P2 [ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ2ρ2u2,P2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1) +λ4ρ2 +λ6.
(4.113)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ1[ρ1u1,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u1,t1(w− t1)]
+λ3 +λ7.
(4.114)
Lt2 = 1−F (v˜2)−f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ2[ρ2u2,t2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)u2,t2(w− t2)]
+λ4 +λ8.
(4.115)
We first find the equilibrium price of the good and the parking fee for Type 1
customer. Equating the first-order condition in (4.112) to zero and using v˜1,P1 = 1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]−λ3ρ1−λ5
ρ1
. (4.116)
Notice that the expression ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 cannot be zero since otherwise
1−F (v˜1) is negative. Thus, by complementary slackness, λ3 = 0. Then, (4.116)
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becomes
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5
ρ1
. (4.117)
Since v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5
ρ1
< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5v˜1,t1 .
(4.118)
Since λ5v˜1,t1 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜1)< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]. (4.119)
Equating the first-order condition in (4.114) to zero and using (4.102),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7. (4.120)
Then, by (4.119), it must be that λ7 > 0. Thus, by complementary slackness, t∗1 = 0.
Then, it cannot be that P1 = 0 since the expression ρ1(P1−cgood)+ t1−clot1 cannot
be negative. Therefore, by complementary slackness, λ5 = 0. Then, by (4.117), in
equilibrium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot1
ρ1
+ cgood, and t∗1 = 0. (4.121)
Similarly, for Type 2 customers, equating the first-order condition in (4.113) to zero
and using v˜2,P2 = 1,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]−λ4ρ2−λ6
ρ2
. (4.122)
Notice that the expression ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 cannot be zero since otherwise
1−F (v˜2) is negative. Thus, by complementary slackness, λ4 = 0. Then, (4.122)
becomes
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6
ρ2
. (4.123)
Since v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6
ρ2
< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6v˜2,t2 .
(4.124)
Since λ6v˜2,t2 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜2)< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]. (4.125)
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Equating the first-order condition in (4.115) to zero and using (4.106),
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8. (4.126)
Then, by (4.125), it must be that λ8 > 0. Thus, by complementary slackness, t∗2 = 0.
Then, it cannot be that P2 = 0 since the expression ρ2(P2−cgood)+ t2−clot2 cannot
be negative. Therefore, by complementary slackness, λ6 = 0. Then, by (4.123), in
equilibrium,
P ∗2 =
1−F (v˜2)
f(v˜2)
+ clot2
ρ2
+ cgood, and t∗2 = 0. (4.127)
Therefore, under third-degree price discrimination where the types of customers
have the different utility functions and probabilities of buying the good, parking is
free for both Type 1 and Type 2, and the costs of the parking lots are embedded in
the prices of the good.
We find that the equilibrium prices, P ∗1 and P ∗2 , are unique. P ∗1 depends negatively
on Type 1’s probability of buying the good while P ∗2 depends negatively on Type
2’s probability of buying the good. As customers become less likely to buy the
good, they pay more for the good. Hence, the mall aims to attract customers with
a higher probability of buying the good by offering them a lower price while making
customers with a lower probability of buying the good pay more for the good.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 4. Under third-degree price discrimination where the types are ob-
servable to the mall, the prices are unique and cover the costs of the parking lots.
Moreover, as customers become less (more) likely to buy the good, they pay more
(less) for the good.
Also, since there is one good, one may consider ρ to be the same regardless of the
type of the customer. In that case, the analysis would not change.
Moreover, notice that the essential difference between this type of price discrimina-
tion and the first type is that in this model, the types of the customer differentiate
with respect to their utility functions. However, as the results show, assigning dif-
ferent utility functions for the two different groups of customers does not change the
equilibrium outcomes.
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5. HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION MODEL
WITH TWO TYPES OF GOODS
In horizontal product differentiation, the goods are not superior to each other and
customers decide to buy the goods based on their subjective preferences such as
color and taste rather than the quality of the goods. For instance, the mall may sell
two types of coffee beans: Arabica and Robusta, and customers purchase a product
based on their preferences on sweeter or stronger taste.
In this chapter, we analyze the pricing strategy of a monopolist mall when there is
horizontal product differentiation. We assume that there are two types of customers,
Type 1 and Type 2, who are only interested in Good 1 and Good 2, respectively.
Since customers make their purchases based on their preferences, they have an in-
centive to reveal their true types. That is why the maximization problem does not
need to include the incentive compatibility constraints.
Since customers self-select their types, the mall can perfectly distinguish the types
and it can separate the parking lot for each type. It is also assumed that the goods
and the parking lots are costly. The mall decides on the prices of each good and the
parking fee for each type of customer.
Type 1 goes to the mall if
ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r). (5.1)
Type 1 is indifferent between going to the mall and staying at home if she has the
valuation v˜1(P1, t1),
v˜1(P1, t1)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)
ρ1
)
−w+P1 + t1. (5.2)
Therefore,
v˜1,P1 = 1, (5.3)
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and
v˜1,t1 = 1 +
(1−ρ1)
ρ1
ut1(w− t1)
ut1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
≥ 1
ρ1
. (5.4)
Notice that if v˜1,t1 = 1/ρ1, then v˜1 = P1. But then, from the equation (5.2), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗1 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1.
Similarly, Type 2 goes to the mall if
ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r). (5.5)
Type 2 is indifferent between going to the mall and staying at home if he has the
valuation v˜2(P2, t2),
v˜2(P2, t2)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)
ρ2
)
−w+P2 + t2. (5.6)
Therefore,
v˜2,P2 = 1, (5.7)
and
v˜2,t2 = 1 +
(1−ρ2)
ρ2
ut2(w− t2)
ut1(w+ v˜2−P2− t2)
≥ 1
ρ2
. (5.8)
Notice that if v˜2,t2 = 1/ρ2, then v˜2 = P2. But then, from the equation (5.6), it
must be that in equilibrium, t∗2 = −r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that
v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, t1, t2), which is the summation of the profits it receives
from each type of customer:
Π(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+[1−F (v˜2)][ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ].
(5.9)
The mall maximizes its profit with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2, subject to individual
rationality constraints of each type,
(IR1) : ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)≥ u(w+ r), (5.10)
(IR2) : ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)≥ u(w+ r), (5.11)
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and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ≥ 0, ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ≥ 0,
P1,P2, t1, t2 ≥ 0.
(5.12)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1,P2, t1, t2) = [1−F (v˜1)][ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+ [1−F (v˜2)][ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ1[ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)−u(w+ r)]
+λ2[ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)−u(w+ r)]
+λ3[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ] +λ4[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ5P1 +λ6P2 +λ7t1 +λ8t2
(5.13)
where λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5,λ6,λ7, and λ8 are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2, t1, and t2,
LP1 = ρ1[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ1ρ1uP1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1) +λ3ρ1 +λ5.
(5.14)
LP2 = ρ2[1−F (v˜2)]−f(v˜2)v˜2,P2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ2ρ2uP2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,P2−1) +λ4ρ2 +λ6.
(5.15)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+λ1[ρ1ut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ut1(w− t1)] +λ3 +λ7.
(5.16)
Lt2 = 1−F (v˜2)−f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
+λ2[ρ2ut2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)ut2(w− t2)] +λ4 +λ8.
(5.17)
Equating the first-order condition in (5.14) to zero and using v˜1,P1 = 1,
ρ1[1−F (v˜1)] +λ3ρ1 +λ5 = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]. (5.18)
Notice that the expression ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 cannot be zero, since ρ1[1−
F (v˜1)] is greater than zero. Then, it must be that λ3 = 0, since by complementary
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slackness condition, λ3[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ] = 0. Therefore, from (5.18),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5
ρ1
. (5.19)
Since v˜1,t1 > 1/ρ1,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)[ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ5
ρ1
< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]− v˜1,t1λ5.
(5.20)
Since v˜1,t1λ5 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜1)< f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]. (5.21)
Equating the first-order condition in (5.16) to zero,
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
−λ1[ρ1ut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ut1(w− t1)]
−λ7.
(5.22)
Notice that by (5.4), (5.22) becomes
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]−λ7. (5.23)
Then, by (5.21), λ7> 0. Hence, by complementary slackness condition, t∗1 = 0. Then,
it must be that P1 > 0, since the expression ρ1(P1−cgood1)+ t1−clot1 cannot be neg-
ative. Therefore, by complementary slackness condition, λ5 = 0 and in equilibrium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot1
ρ1
+ cgood1 , and t
∗
1 = 0. (5.24)
To find the equilibrium price of the good and the parking fee for Type 2, similar
steps are followed:
Equating the first-order condition in (5.15) to zero and using v˜2,P2 = 1,
ρ2[1−F (v˜2)] +λ4ρ2 +λ6 = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]. (5.25)
Notice that the expression ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 cannot be zero, since ρ2[1−
F (v˜2)] is greater than zero. Then, it must be that λ4 = 0, since by complementary
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slackness condition, λ4[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ] = 0. Therefore, from (5.25),
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6
ρ2
. (5.26)
Since v˜2,t2 > 1/ρ2,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)[ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ6
ρ2
< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]− v˜2,t2λ6.
(5.27)
Since v˜2,t2λ6 ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜2)< f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]. (5.28)
Equating the first-order condition in (5.17) to zero,
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]
−λ2[ρ2ut2(w+v2−P2− t2)(v˜2,t2−1)− (1−ρ2)ut2(w− t2)]
−λ8.
(5.29)
Notice that by (5.8), (5.29) becomes
1−F (v˜2) = f(v˜2)v˜2,t2 [ρ2(P2− cgood2) + t2− clot2 ]−λ8. (5.30)
Then, by (5.28), λ8> 0. Hence, by complementary slackness condition, t∗2 = 0. Then,
it must be that P2 > 0, since the expression ρ2(P2−cgood2)+ t2−clot2 cannot be neg-
ative. Therefore, by complementary slackness condition, λ6 = 0 and in equilibrium,
P ∗2 =
1−F (v˜2)
f(v˜2)
+ clot2
ρ2
+ cgood2 , and t
∗
2 = 0. (5.31)
Therefore, under horizontal product differentiation where the types of customers
have different preferences, parking is free for both Type 1 and Type 2 and the cost
of the parking lot is embedded in the prices of Good 1 and Good 2. In this model,
the types are observable to the mall since customers reveal their true preferences.
The equilibrium prices of the goods are not affected by the probability of finding
the other good.
The prices of Good 1 and Good 2 are unique. For each good, the price of the good
depends negatively on the probability of finding the good. As customers become
less likely to buy the good, they pay more for that good. Hence, the mall aims to
attract the customers with a higher probability of buying the good by offering them
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a lower price while making the customers with a lower probability of buying the
good pay more for the good.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 5. Under horizontal product differentiation where the types of cus-
tomers have different preferences, the prices of Good 1 and Good 2 are unique and
cover the costs of the parking lots. Moreover, as customers become less (more) likely
to buy the good, they pay more (less) for the good.
38
6. PRICE DISCRIMINATION MODELS WITH N TYPES OF
CUSTOMERS
This chapter studies the generalization of the models constructed in Chapter 4 for
more than two types of customers. We assume that there are n types of customers:
Type 1, Type 2,..., and Type N . Type i has a valuation vi ∈ [0, v¯i] for the good.
The mall sells the good at a price Pi and provides parking lot to Type i customers
at a fee ti.
6.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination
In this model, there is one type of good. Suppose that the mall can perfectly
differentiate the customers and their willingness to pay for the good. Therefore, the
mall can set different prices for the good and the parking fee for each different type
of customer.
Type i goes to the mall if
ρu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρ)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r). (6.1)
The marginal customer of Type i who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜i(Pi, ti),
v˜i(Pi, ti)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρ)u(w− ti)
ρ
)
−w+Pi+ ti, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.2)
Therefore, for all i= 1, ...,N,
v˜i,Pi = 1, (6.3)
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and
v˜i,ti = 1 +
(1−ρ)
ρ
uti(w− ti)
uti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
≥ 1
ρ
. (6.4)
Notice that if v˜i,ti = 1/ρ, then v˜i = Pi. But then, from the equation (6.2), it must be
that in equilibrium, t∗i =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜i,ti > 1/ρ.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ), which is the summation of the
profits it receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]. (6.5)
The mall maximizes its profit subject to individual rationality constraints of each
Type i,
(IRi) : ρu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρ)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r), ∀i= 1, ...,N, (6.6)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot ≥ 0, and Pi, ti ≥ 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.7)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
[1−F (v˜i)][ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]
+
N∑
i=1
λi[ρu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρ)u(w− ti)−u(w+ r)]
+
N∑
i=1
µi[ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot] +
N∑
i=1
δiPi+
N∑
i=1
γiti
(6.8)
where λi,µi, δi, and γi, for all i= 1, ...,N are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2...,PN , and t1, t2, ..., tN ,
LPi = ρ[1−F (v˜i)]−f(v˜i)v˜i,Pi [ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]
+λiρuPi(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,Pi−1) +µiρ+ δi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.9)
Lti = 1−F (v˜i)−f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]
+λi[ρuti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρ)uti(w− ti)]
+µi+γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.10)
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Equating (6.9) to zero for all i= 1, ...,N and using v˜i,Pi = 1,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]−µiρ− δi
ρ
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.11)
Notice that the expression ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot cannot be zero, since 1−F (v˜i) is
strictly greater than zero. Then, by complementary slackness condition, it must be
that µi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N. Therefore, (6.11) becomes
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]− δi
ρ
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.12)
Since v˜i,ti > 1/ρ,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]− δi
ρ
< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]− δiv˜i,ti , ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.13)
Since δiv˜i,ti ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜i)< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot], ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.14)
Equating the first-order condition in (6.10) to zero and using (6.4),
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot]−γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.15)
Then, by (6.14), it must be that γi > 0, for all i= 1, ...,N . Then, by complementary
slackness condition, t∗i = 0, for all i = 1, ...,N . Then, it must be that Pi > 0, since
the expression ρ(Pi− cgood) + ti− clot cannot be negative. Then, by complementary
slackness condition, δi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N and in equilibrium,
P ∗i =
1−F (v˜i)
f(v˜i)
+ clot
ρ
+ cgood, and t∗i = 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.16)
Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Proposition 1 holds when there are n types of customers.
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6.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In this section, there are n types of goods: Good 1, Good 2,..., Good N . Good i
has a marginal cost cgoodi > 0 and the probability of finding it is ρi ∈ (0,1). The
marginal cost of the parking lot for Good i buyers is cloti > 0. The mall knows
that there are different types of customers but cannot identify the type of a given
customer.
6.2.1 Types are differing in probability of buying the good
Type i customer goes to the mall if and only if
ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r), ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.17)
Type i customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has a valuation
v˜i(Pi, ti),
v˜i(Pi, ti)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρi)u(w− ti)
ρi
)
−w+Pi+ ti, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.18)
Therefore, for all i= 1, ...,N ,1
v˜i,Pi = 1, (6.19)
and
v˜i,ti = 1 +
(1−ρi)
ρi
uti(w− ti)
uti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
≥ 1
ρi
. (6.20)
Notice that if v˜i,ti = 1/ρi, then v˜i = Pi. But then, from the equation (6.18), it must
be that in equilibrium, t∗i =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜i,ti > 1/ρi.
The mall’s profit is Π(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ), which is the summation of the profits it
receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]. (6.21)
The mall maximizes its profit, subject to individual rationality constraints of each
1Note that v˜i,P−i = 0 and v˜i,t−i = 0,∀i ∈ {1, ...,N},∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+1, ...,N}.
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type i,
(IRi) : ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r), ∀i= 1, ...,N, (6.22)
and the incentive compatibility constraints of each type,
(ICi) : ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)
≥ ρ−iu(w+v−i−P−i− t−i) + (1−ρ−i)u(w− t−i),
∀i ∈ {1, ...,N}, ∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+ 1, ...,N},
(6.23)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ≥ 0, Pi, ti ≥ 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.24)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]
+
N∑
i=1
λi[ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)−u(w+ r)]
+
N∑
i6=1
µ1i[ρ1u(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u(w− t1)
−ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)u(w− ti)]
+
N∑
i6=2
µ2i[ρ2u(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u(w− t2)
−ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)u(w− ti)]
...
+
N−1∑
i=1
µNi[ρNu(w+vN −PN − tN ) + (1−ρN )u(w− tN )
−ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)u(w− ti)]
+
N∑
i=1
τi[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ] +
N∑
i=1
δiPi+
N∑
i=1
γiti
(6.25)
where λi,µ1i, ...,µNi, τi, δi, and γi, for all i= 1, ...,N are Lagrangian multipliers.
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Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1, ...,PN , and t1, ..., tN ,
LP1 = ρ1[1−F (v˜1)]−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+
λ1 + N∑
i6=1
µ1i−
N∑
i 6=1
µi1
ρ1uP1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1)
+ τ1ρ1 + δ1.
(6.26)
...
LPN = ρN [1−F (v˜N )]−f(v˜N )v˜N,PN [ρN (PN − cgoodN ) + tN − clotN ]
+
λN +N−1∑
i=1
µNi−
N−1∑
i=1
µiN
ρNuPN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,PN −1)
+ τNρN + δN .
(6.27)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1 [ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1 ]
+
λ1 + N∑
i 6=1
µ1i−
N∑
i6=1
µi1
 [ρ1ut1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ut1(w− t1)]
+ τ1 +γ1.
(6.28)
...
LtN = 1−F (v˜N )−f(v˜N )v˜N,tN [ρN (PN − cgoodN ) + tN − clotN ]
+
λN +N−1∑
i=1
µNi−
N−1∑
i=1
µiN
 [ρNutN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)
− (1−ρN )utN (w− tN )] + τN +γN .
(6.29)
Equating LPi to zero and v˜i,Pi = 1,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− τiρi− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.30)
Then, it must be that ρi(Pi− cgoodi)+ ti− cloti > 0. Then, by complementary slack-
ness, τi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N. Then, (6.30) becomes
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.31)
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Since v˜i,ti > 1/ρi, for all i= 1, ...,N.,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δiv˜i,ti .
(6.32)
Since δiv˜i,ti ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜i)< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]. (6.33)
Equating Lti to zero and using (6.20),
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]−γi. (6.34)
By (6.33), γi > 0, for all i = 1, ...,N. By complementary slackness, t∗i = 0, for all
i = 1, ...,N. Then, since ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti > 0, for all i = 1, ...,N , it must be
that Pi> 0, for all i= 1, ...,N. By complementary slackness, δi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N.
Therefore, by (6.31), in equilibrium,
P ∗i =
1−F (v˜i)
f(v˜i)
+ cloti
ρi
+ cgoodi , and t
∗
i = 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.35)
Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Proposition 2 holds when there are n types of customers and n
types of goods.
6.2.2 Types are differing in their attitudes towards risk
Suppose that customers have different utility functions and degree of risk-aversion.
Let Type i customers have a utility function ui. Further, without loss of generality,
suppose that from Type 1 to Type N , the degree of risk-aversion is decreasing. That
is, Type 1 is the most risk-averse type, Type 2 is less risk-averse than Type 1 but
more risk-averse than Type 3 and so on. Type N is the least risk-averse type. Let
h2,h3, ...hN be increasing concave functions such that u1 = h2 ◦u2, u2 = h3 ◦u3, and
so on. Therefore, u1 = h2 ◦h3 ◦h4 ◦ ...◦hN ◦uN .2
2Note that the composition of increasing concave functions is also concave.
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Type i goes to the mall if
ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)≥ ui(w+ r). (6.36)
The marginal customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has a
valuation v˜i(Pi, ti),
v˜i(Pi, ti)≡ u−1i
(
ui(w+ r)− (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)
ρi
)
−w+Pi+ ti. (6.37)
Therefore, for all i= 1, ...,N,3
v˜i,Pi = 1, (6.38)
and
v˜i,ti = 1 +
(1−ρi)
ρi
ui,ti(w− ti)
ui,ti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
≥ 1
ρi
. (6.39)
Notice that if v˜i,ti = 1/ρi, then v˜i = Pi. But then, from the equation (6.37), it must
be that in equilibrium, t∗i =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜i,ti > 1/ρi.
Then, the mall maximizes its profit, Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ),which is the sum-
mation of the profits it receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ], (6.40)
subject to individual rationality constraints of each type i,
(IRi) : ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti)+(1−ρi)ui(w− ti)≥ ui(w+r), ∀i= 1, ...,N, (6.41)
and the incentive compatibility constraints of each type,
(ICi) : ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)
≥ ρ−iui(w+v−i−P−i− t−i) + (1−ρ−i)ui(w− t−i),
∀i ∈ {1, ...,N}, ∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+ 1, ...,N},
(6.42)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ≥ 0, Pi, ti ≥ 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.43)
3Note that v˜i,P−i = 0 and v˜i,t−i = 0,∀i= 1, ...,N,∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+1, ...,N}.
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The Lagrangian function is
L(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]
+
N∑
i=1
λi[ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)−ui(w+ r)]
+
N∑
i 6=1
µ1i[ρ1u1(w+v1−P1− t1) + (1−ρ1)u1(w− t1)
−ρiu1(w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)u1(w− ti)]
+
N∑
i6=2
µ2i[ρ2u2(w+v2−P2− t2) + (1−ρ2)u2(w− t2)
−ρiu2(w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)u2(w− ti)]
...
+
N−1∑
i=1
µNi[ρNuN (w+vN −PN − tN ) + (1−ρN )uN (w− tN )
−ρiuN (w+vi−Pi− ti)− (1−ρi)uN (w− ti)]
+
N∑
i=1
τi[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ] +
N∑
i=1
δiPi+
N∑
i=1
γiti
(6.44)
where λi,µ1i, ...,µNi, τi, δi, and γi, for all i= 1, ...,N are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1, ...,PN , and t1, ..., tN ,
LP1 = ρ1(1−F (v˜1))−f(v˜1)v˜1,P1(ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1)
+λ1ρ1u1,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1)
+
 N∑
i6=1
µ1i
ρ1u1,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,P1−1)
−
 N∑
i6=1
µi1ui,P1(w+v1−P1− t1)
ρ1(v˜1,P1−1) + τ1ρ1 + δ1.
(6.45)
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...
LPN = ρN (1−F (v˜N ))−f(v˜N )v˜N,PN (ρN (PN − cgoodN ) + tN − clotN )
+λNρNuN,PN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,PN −1)
+
N−1∑
i=1
µNi
ρNuN,PN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,PN −1)
−
N−1∑
i=1
µiNui,PN (w+vN −PN − tN )
ρN (v˜N,PN −1) + τNρN + δN .
(6.46)
Lt1 = 1−F (v˜1)−f(v˜1)v˜1,t1(ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1)
+λ1[ρ1u1,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u1,t1(w− t1)]
+
 N∑
i 6=1
µ1i
 [ρ1u1,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)u1,t1(w− t1)]
−
N∑
i 6=1
µi1[ρ1ui,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ui,t1(w− t1)]
+ τ1 +γ1.
(6.47)
...
LtN = 1−F (v˜N )−f(v˜N )v˜N,tN (ρN (PN − cgoodN ) + tN − clotN )
+λN [ρNuN,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )uN,tN (w− tN )]
+
N−1∑
i=1
µNi
 [ρNuN,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )uN,tN (w− tN )]
−
N−1∑
i=1
µiN [ρNui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )ui,tN (w− tN )]
+ τN +γN .
(6.48)
Equating LPi to zero and v˜i,Pi = 1,
ρi(1−F (v˜i)) = f(v˜i)(ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti)− τiρi− δi, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.49)
Then, it must be that ρi(Pi− cgoodi)+ ti− cloti > 0. Then, by complementary slack-
ness, τi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N. Then, (6.49) becomes
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)(ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti)− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.50)
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Since v˜i,ti > 1/ρi, for all i= 1, ...,N ,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δiv˜i,ti , ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.51)
Since δiv˜i,ti ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜i)< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ], ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.52)
We examine the cases for Type 1 and Type N separately. First, we find the equi-
librium price for the most risk-averse type, Type 1:
Equating Lt1 to zero and using (6.39),
1−F (v˜1) = f(v˜1)v˜1,t1(ρ1(P1− cgood1) + t1− clot1)
+
N∑
i 6=1
µi1[ρ1ui,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ui,t1(w− t1)]
−γ1.
(6.53)
Note that by (6.39), for all i= 2, ...,N ,
ρ1ui,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ui,t1(w− t1)
= (1−ρ1)
[
ui,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
−ui,t1(w− t1)
]
. (6.54)
Since u1 = h◦ui for some increasing concave function h,
u1,t1(w− t1)
u1,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
= ht1(ui(w− t1))ui,t1(w− t1)
ht1(ui(w+ v˜1−P1− t1))ui,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
. (6.55)
Since ui is an increasing function and v˜1 > P1, ui(w+ v˜1−P1− t1) > ui(w− t1).
Since h is a concave function, its derivative is a decreasing function. Therefore,
ht1(ui(w− t1))> ht1(ui(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)). Since the derivative of the function ui is
positive,
ht1(ui(w− t1))ui,t1(w− t1)
ht1(ui(w+ v˜1−P1− t1))ui,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
>
ui,t1(w− t1)
ui,t1(w+ v˜1−P1− t1)
. (6.56)
Therefore, (6.54) is strictly positive. Hence,
N∑
i 6=1
µi1[ρ1ui,t1(w+v1−P1− t1)(v˜1,t1−1)− (1−ρ1)ui,t1(w− t1)]≥ 0, (6.57)
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with equality if and only if µi1 = 0, for all i= 2, ...,N. Hence, by (6.52), γ1 is strictly
positive. By complementary slackness, t∗1 = 0. Then, since the expression ρ1(P1−
cgood1) + t1− clot1 cannot be negative, P1 > 0. Hence, by complementary slackness
δ1 = 0. Then, by (6.50), in equilibrium,
P ∗1 =
1−F (v˜1)
f(v˜1)
+ clot1
ρ1
+ cgood1 , and t
∗
1 = 0. (6.58)
Now, we find the equilibrium price of the good and the parking fee for the other
types of customers except Type 1 and Type N : Fixing any i= 2, ...,N−1, equating
Lti to zero and using (6.39),
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)v˜i,ti(ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti)
+
N∑
j 6=i
j=1,...,N
µji[ρiuj,ti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρi)uj,ti(w− ti)]
−γi.
(6.59)
Note that by (6.39), ∀j 6= i,
ρiuj,ti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρi)uj,ti(w− ti)
= (1−ρi)
[
uj,ti(w+vi−Pi− ti)
ui,ti(w− ti)
ui,ti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
−uj,ti(w− ti)
]
(6.60)
which is strictly positive for j’s who are less risk-averse than i while strictly negative
for j’s who are more risk-averse than i. Hence, except for the most risk-averse (Type
1) and the least risk-averse (Type N) types, (6.60) could be (strictly) positive or
negative. Then,
N∑
j 6=i
j=1,...,N
µji[ρiuj,ti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρi)uj,ti(w− ti)] (6.61)
is zero if and only if µji = 0,∀j 6= i.
For any case where the expression in (6.60) is zero or positive, it must be that
γi is strictly positive due to (6.52) and (6.59). Then, by complementary slackness,
ti = 0. Then, since the expression ρi(Pi−cgoodi)+ti−cloti cannot be negative, Pi> 0.
Hence, by complementary slackness, δi = 0. Then, by (6.50), in equilibrium,
P ∗i =
1−F (v˜i)
f(v˜i)
+ cloti
ρi
+ cgoodi , and t
∗
i = 0, ∀i= 2, ...,N −1. (6.62)
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Note that (6.60) is zero if and only if µji = 0,∀j 6= i, and one of the cases where it
is positive is when µji = 0, for all j’s that are more risk-averse than i.
For any case where (6.60) is strictly negative, γi could be zero or strictly positive.
Hence, there are infinitely many optimal solutions of parking fee and the price of
the good. These solutions include the cases where the mall charges zero parking fee
as well as the cases where it charges a strictly positive parking fee. The equilibrium
prices in (6.62) are also in this infinite set.
For Type N , equating LtN to zero and using (6.39),
1−F (v˜N ) = f(v˜N )v˜N,tN (ρN (PN − cgoodN ) + tN − clotN )
+
N−1∑
i=1
µiN [ρNui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )ui,tN (w− tN )]
−γN .
(6.63)
Note that by (6.39), for all i= 1, ...,N −1,
ρNui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )ui,tN (w− tN )
= (1−ρN )[ui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )
uN,tN (w− tN )
uN,tN (w+ v˜N −PN − tN )
−ui,tN (w− tN )].
(6.64)
Since ui = g ◦uN , for some increasing concave function g,4
ui,tN (w− tN )
ui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )
= gtN (uN (w− tN ))uN,tN (w− tN )
gtN (uN (w+vN −PN − tN ))uN,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )
.
(6.65)
Since vN > PN and uN is increasing, uN (w+ vN −PN − tN ) > uN (w− tN ). Since
gtN is decreasing, gtN (uN (w+vN −PN − tN ))< gtN (uN (w− tN )). Hence,
uN,tN (w− tN )
uN,tN (w+ v˜N −PN − tN )
<
ui,tN (w− tN )
ui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )
. (6.66)
Therefore, (6.64) is strictly negative, and so
N−1∑
i=1
µiN [ρNui,tN (w+vN −PN − tN )(v˜N,tN −1)− (1−ρN )ui,tN (w− tN )]≤ 0, (6.67)
4gx stands for ∂g/∂x.
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with equality if and only if µiN = 0, for all i = 1, ...,N − 1. If µiN = 0, for all i =
1, ...,N − 1, then (6.67) holds with equality and γN is strictly positive due to
(6.52) and (6.63). By complementary slackness, tN = 0. Then, since the expression
ρN (PN −cgoodN )+ tN −clotN cannot be negative, PN > 0. Hence, by complementary
slackness, δN = 0. Then, by (6.50), in equilibrium,
P ∗N =
1−F (v˜N )
f(v˜N )
+ clotN
ρN
+ cgoodN , and t
∗
N = 0. (6.68)
However, if for any i= 1, ...,N−1, µiN > 0, then (6.64) is strictly negative. Then, γi
could be zero or strictly positive. Hence, there are infinitely many optimal solutions
of parking fee and the price of the good. These solutions include the cases where the
mall charges zero parking fee as well as the cases where it charges a strictly positive
parking fee. The equilibrium prices in (6.68) are also in this infinite set.
Under second-degree price discrimination where the types of customers have different
attitudes towards risk and probabilities of finding (or buying) the goods, parking
is free for the type of customer who is the most risk-averse among all types of
customers. Thus, the mall has an incentive to insure the most risk-averse customer
for the risk of not finding the good. The cost of the parking lot of this type is
embedded in the prices of the good they buy. Moreover, the price is unique and
depends negatively on the probability of finding the good. As they become less
likely to buy the good, they pay more for the good.
For every other type, while free parking is an optimal solution, it is not the unique
solution. That is, the mall can set parking fee to be strictly positive or free. Hence,
the mall is flexible in embedding the cost of parking lot reserved for other types of
customers into the price of the goods. If the mall chooses to provide parking for
free for the other types, then the optimal price it can set is unique. In that case,
the price of the good depends negatively on the probability of finding the good. As
the customer becomes less likely to buy the good, she pays more for that good. To
make free parking optimal, one of the things the mall can do is to set the prices such
that every type strictly prefers revealing their true types.
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 8. Under second-degree price discrimination where customers differ in
their degree of risk-aversion, the price of the good that the most risk-averse customer
buys is unique and covers the costs of the parking lots. Moreover, as the most risk-
averse customer becomes less (more) likely to buy the good, she pays more (less)
for the good. On the other hand, these results may not hold for other types of
customers.
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6.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
In this model, every customer is interested in the same good. The mall can separate
the customers into groups and charge each group differently. There are n types of
customers. Type i customer has a probability ρi ∈ (0,1) of buying the good. The
marginal cost of the parking lot of Type i customer is cloti .
Type i goes to the mall if
ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)≥ ui(w+ r). (6.69)
The marginal customer who is indifferent between going to the mall or not has a
valuation v˜i(Pi, ti),
v˜i(Pi, ti)≡ u−1i
(
ui(w+ r)− (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)
ρi
)
−w+Pi+ ti, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.70)
Therefore,5
v˜i,Pi = 1, (6.71)
and
v˜i,ti = 1 +
(1−ρi)
ρi
ui,ti(w− ti)
ui,ti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
≥ 1
ρi
. (6.72)
Notice that if v˜i,ti = 1/ρi, then v˜i = Pi. But then, from the equation (6.70), it must
be that in equilibrium, t∗i =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜i,ti > 1/ρi.
Then, the mall maximizes its profit, Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ), which is the sum-
mation of the profits it receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ], (6.73)
subject to individual rationality constraints of each type i,
(IRi) : ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti)+(1−ρi)ui(w− ti)≥ ui(w+r), ∀i= 1, ...,N, (6.74)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ≥ 0, and Pi, ti ≥ 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.75)
5Note that v˜i,P−i = 0 and v˜i,t−i = 0,∀i= 1, ...,N,∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+1, ...,N}.
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The Lagrangian function is
L(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
[1−F (v˜i)][ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]
+
N∑
i=1
λi[ρiui(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)ui(w− ti)−ui(w+ r)]
+
N∑
i=1
µi[ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ] +
N∑
i=1
δiPi+
N∑
i=1
γiti
(6.76)
where λi,µi, δi, and γi, for all i= 1, ...,N are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2...,PN , and t1, t2, ..., tN ,
LPi = ρi[1−F (v˜i)]−f(v˜i)v˜i,Pi [ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]
+λiρiui,Pi(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,Pi−1) +µiρi+ δi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.77)
Lti = 1−F (v˜i)−f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]
+λi[ρiui,ti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρi)ui,ti(w− ti)]
+µi+γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.78)
Equating (6.77) to zero for all i= 1, ...,N and using v˜i,Pi = 1,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]−µiρi− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.79)
Notice that ρi(Pi−cgood)+ ti−cloti cannot be zero, since 1−F (v˜i) is strictly greater
than zero. Therefore, by complementary slackness, µi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N. There-
fore, (6.79) becomes
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.80)
Since v˜i,ti > 1/ρi,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]− δiv˜i,ti , ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(6.81)
Since δiv˜i,ti ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜i)< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ], ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.82)
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Equating the first-order condition in (6.78) to zero and using (6.72),
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgood) + ti− cloti ]−γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.83)
But then, by (6.82), it must be that γi > 0, for all i = 1, ...,N . By complementary
slackness, t∗i = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N . Then, it must be that Pi> 0, since the expression
ρi(Pi−cgood)+ ti−cloti cannot be negative. Therefore, by complementary slackness,
δi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N and in equilibrium,
P ∗i =
1−F (v˜i)
f(v˜i)
+ cloti
ρi
+ cgood, and t∗i = 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (6.84)
Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 9. Proposition 4 holds when there are n types of customers.
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7. HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION MODEL
WITH N TYPES OF GOODS
This chapter studies the generalization of the model constructed in Chapter 5 for
more than two types of goods.
Suppose that there are n types of customers: Type 1, Type 2,..., Type N , and n
types of goods: Good 1, Good 2,..., Good N in the mall. Further, suppose that
each type of customer is interested in exactly one of the goods and they decide to
buy a good based on their subjective preferences such as color and taste. Let Type
i customers be interested in Good i. The mall decides on the price and the fee of
the parking lot for each type separately.
Type i goes to the mall if
ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r). (7.1)
The marginal customer of Type i who is indifferent between going to the mall or
not has a valuation v˜i(Pi, ti),
v˜i(Pi, ti)≡ u−1
(
u(w+ r)− (1−ρi)u(w− ti)
ρi
)
−w+Pi+ ti, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.2)
Therefore, for all i= 1, ...,N1
v˜i,Pi = 1, (7.3)
and
v˜i,ti = 1 +
(1−ρi)
ρi
uti(w− ti)
uti(w+ v˜i−Pi− ti)
≥ 1
ρi
. (7.4)
Notice that if v˜i,ti = 1/ρi, then v˜i =Pi. But then, from the equation (7.2), it must be
that in equilibrium, t∗i =−r. Since this is not feasible, it must be that v˜i,ti > 1/ρi.
Then, the mall maximizes its profit, Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ), which is the sum-
1Note that v˜i,P−i = 0 and v˜i,t−i = 0,∀i= 1, ...,N,∀− i ∈ {1, ..., i−1, i+1, ...,N}.
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mation of the profits it receives from each type of customer,
Π(P1,P2, ...,PN , t1, t2, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
(1−F (v˜i))[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ], (7.5)
subject to individual rationality constraints of each type i,
(IRi) : ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)≥ u(w+ r), ∀i= 1, ...,N, (7.6)
and the non-negativity constraints,
ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ≥ 0, and Pi, ti ≥ 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.7)
The Lagrangian function is
L(P1, ...,PN , t1, ..., tN ) =
N∑
i=1
[1−F (v˜i)][ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]
+
N∑
i=1
λi[ρiu(w+vi−Pi− ti) + (1−ρi)u(w− ti)−u(w+ r)]
+
N∑
i=1
µi[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ] +
N∑
i=1
δiPi+
N∑
i=1
γiti
(7.8)
where λi,µi, δi, and γi, for all i= 1, ...,N are Lagrangian multipliers.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to P1,P2...,PN , and t1, t2, ..., tN ,
LPi = ρi[1−F (v˜i)]−f(v˜i)v˜i,Pi [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]
+λiρiuPi(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,Pi−1) +µiρi+ δi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(7.9)
Lti = 1−F (v˜i)−f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]
+λi[ρiuti(w+vi−Pi− ti)(v˜i,ti−1)− (1−ρi)uti(w− ti)]
+µi+γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(7.10)
Equating (7.9) to zero for all i= 1, ...,N and using v˜i,Pi = 1,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]−µiρi− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.11)
Notice that the expression ρi(Pi−cgoodi)+ ti−cloti cannot be zero, since 1−F (v˜i) is
strictly greater than zero. Therefore, by complementary slackness condition, µi = 0,
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for all i= 1, ...,N. Then, (7.11) becomes
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.12)
Since v˜i,ti > 1/ρi,
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)[ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δi
ρi
< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]− δiv˜i,ti , ∀i= 1, ...,N.
(7.13)
Since δiv˜i,ti ≥ 0,
1−F (v˜i)< f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ], ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.14)
Equating the first-order condition in (7.10) to zero and using (7.4),
1−F (v˜i) = f(v˜i)v˜i,ti [ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti ]−γi, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.15)
Then, by (7.14), it must be that γi > 0, for all i = 1, ...,N . Therefore, by com-
plementary slackness condition, t∗i = 0, for all i = 1, ...,N . Since the expression
ρi(Pi− cgoodi) + ti− cloti cannot be negative, it must be that Pi > 0. Then, by
complementary slackness condition, δi = 0, for all i= 1, ...,N and in equilibrium,
P ∗i =
1−F (v˜i)
f(v˜i)
+ cloti
ρi
+ cgoodi , and t
∗
i = 0, ∀i= 1, ...,N. (7.16)
Therefore, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 10. Proposition 5 holds when there are n types of customers and n
types of goods.
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8. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we construct a model to analyze how a monopolist shopping mall
determines the prices of the goods and parking fees when it has some degree of
ability to identify the types of customers. Customers have valuations over the goods
and when they visit the mall and examine the goods, they may decide to leave the
mall empty-handed. Hence, they take a risk by going to the mall.
Under first and third-degree price discrimination and horizontal product differen-
tiation, the mall is able to distinguish the types of the customers, either because
customers reveal their true types themselves or the mall can make them. Then, the
mall provides free parking for all and embeds the cost of parking into the prices of
the goods. Hence, the mall uses parking as a loss leader. Moreover, there is always
a negative relationship between the price of the good and the probability of buying
the good. Hence, as customers become less likely to buy the good, they pay more
for the good.
Under second-degree price discrimination, we analyze two cases: In the first one
customers have different probabilities of buying the good and in the second one,
they have different attitudes towards risk. In the initial case, the results are similar
to the other types of price discrimination. However, in the latter one, the results are
more complex in the sense that while the mall still provides free parking to the most
risk-averse customer, it may charge a positive fee for other types of customers. Thus,
while the mall has an incentive to insure the most risk-averse customer for the risk of
not finding or buying the good, it does not necessarily have such an incentive for the
others. Hence, the degree of risk-aversion is essential in this setup. In addition, even
though the negative relationship between the price and the probability of buying
the good still holds for the most risk-averse customer, it is not necessarily true for
the other types of customers.
One future research topic is to analyze the pricing strategy of the shopping mall
when there are many goods and customers decide how many and which goods to
buy. Then, the mall may prefer mixed bundling. Another topic is to study our
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model when the shopping mall is not a monopoly. In that case, customers decide
whether to stay at home or go to a mall, and if they decide to go, they choose a
mall to visit.
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